

The University of Chicago

ANTI-ENGLISH
OPINION IN FRANCE, 1763-89
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE NATION (1781-89)

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
1943

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FRANCES ACOMB

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CHAPTER VI

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE NATION

The 1780's were, in the history of public opinion, a decade of rapid change and complexity. Yet some ideas did not change. The old absolutist conservatism, for example, though its literary expression was considerably diminished in quantity and influence, by no means disappeared. Throughout the decade absolutist writers continued to see in limited monarchy a subversive and essentially republican ideal and to regard Anglophile doctrine as the arch-foe of the monarchy in France. If there was any change at all to be detected in the viewpoint of these people, it was in the direction of reaction. To this period belongs one of the most extreme of all conservative statements of belief, the Coup d'oeil sur le gouvernement anglois of the Abbé Dubois de Launay, a work which, complaining that the great vice of the English was love of novelty, asserted that old laws, though imperfect, were preferable to newer though wiser ones.¹ The Année littéraire, while unable to be so reactionary as this, nevertheless found Dubois de Launay's book sound and useful upon the whole.

It is a truly patriotic enterprise [this journal commented] to add, by means of comparison, further reasons to those we all have for blessing the government under which we live. It is important for the tranquillity of the state that its subjects submit themselves to it with love and joy, a thing which will never take place if their prejudiced imagination continually envisages a neighboring people as happier and better governed. . . . Anglomania having repaired its losses, as the author puts it, since the close of the war [the War for American Independence], it is important to prevent ignorance from adding credit to the odious comparisons which one hears made daily between our régime and that of our neighbors.²

There were other and more moderate expressions of hostility to the example of England. Enlightened conservatives might

¹Dubois de Launay, Coup d'oeil sur le gouvernement anglois (1786), pp. 36-37.

²L'année littéraire, ou suite des lettres sur quelques écrits de ce temps, 1787, II, 73 and 83.

admit now as they had done before, that England had in certain respects a good administration.¹ However, they would not admit that the English constitution was anything but a foe of that summum bonum, the public tranquillity.²

Conservative hostility to Anglophile ideas was manifested on a number of specific issues. One of the first of these was the administration and political ideas of the banker Necker who, shortly after publishing in 1781 the first treasury statement in the history of France, the famous Compte rendu au roi, was forced to resign from his post of director general of the finances. Rightly or wrongly, Necker at that time inspired more confidence among sympathizers of reform than any other man in public life, and was conversely hated by many conservatives for either personal or general reasons. He had established the reputation of an Anglophile even before the American Revolution.³ During his incumbency of office, he had been accused of having English banking connections to whose interests he deferred while France and England were at war.⁴

While the latter charge could not be substantiated, the Compte rendu did present a vulnerable opening to attacks from those who were hostile to Anglophile ideas. In this work Necker explicitly declared that public knowledge of the government's financial position was one of the reasons for the strength of English credit.⁵ The Compte rendu, which was an apology for

¹[François-René] Turpin, Histoire des révolutions d'Angleterre, pour servir de suite à celles du père d'Orléans (new ed.; 2 vols.; Paris, 1793 [first edition, 1786]), I, xl.

²[L.-A. de Caraccioli], Les entretiens du palais-royal (2 vols.; Utrecht and Paris, 1787), I, 9-10 and 27-28 [first edition 1786]; [Dusaulx], Observations sur l'histoire de la Bastille, publiée par M. Linguet, avec des remarques sur le caractère de l'auteur, suivies de quelques notes sur sa manière d'écrire l'histoire politique, civile et littéraire (London, 1783), pp. 115-17 and passim; [Gabriel Sénac de Meilhan], Considérations sur l'esprit et les mœurs (London, 1787), pp. 102-3 and 159; Turpin, op. cit., I, xxxiii-xxxix.

³Eloge de Jean-Baptiste Colbert; discours qui a remporté le prix de l'Académie française en 1773, in Oeuvres complètes de M. Necker, ed. Baron de Staël (15 vols.; Paris, 1820-21), XV, 83-84 and 119; Sur la législation et le commerce des grains (Paris, 1775), ibid., I, 131-34.

⁴E. Lavaquery, Necker fourrier de la Révolution 1732-1804 (Paris [1933]), pp. 180-84.

⁵Compte rendu du roi, in Oeuvres, II, 3.

Necker's administration, showed a surplus where there was in reality a deficit, and had been published to confirm public confidence in the solvency of the government, as it did. Necker's enemies declared, however, that the principle of the reference of these matters to the public was subversive of the monarchy itself, that Necker, by his parallels with England, was seeking to inspire a preference for English forms of government, and that in any case the Compte rendu could not have the same effect as a treasury statement presented by the English ministry to the parliament of England. For, by the nature of government in France, the nation was not in a position to control the treasury and, if permitted to scrutinize the government's accounts, would only be left with fears and suspicions harmful to the tranquillity of the state.¹

Most conservatives, moreover, strongly disapproved of Necker's lavish borrowing policy, in which he was again accused of taking England for his model and seeking to foster attitudes hostile to the monarchy, as well as to encourage the propagation of a race of stock-jobbers. Conservatives denounced the capitalists who, it was said, were threatening, by their control of the state's movable wealth, to dictate policy and, in alliance with the capitalists of England, to pursue measures harmful to the welfare of their own country.²

Necker's treatise on government finance, De l'administration des finances de la France, published a few years after the Compte rendu, repeated the views of the last-named work upon the relation between politics and credit,³ as well as those which

¹[De Coppons], Observations sur le Compte rendu au roi par M. Necker, directeur général des finances, au mois de janvier 1781, in Critique de la théorie et pratique de M. Necker, dans l'administration des finances de la France (2 vols.; 1785), I, 32-33; Réponse du sieur Bourboulon, officier employé dans les finances de Mgr. le comte d'Artois, au Compte rendu au roi, par M. Necker, directeur général des finances (London, 1781), p. 15; Vergennes, quoted in Marcel Marion, Histoire financière de la France depuis 1715 (6 vols.; Paris, 1914-31), I, 330, n.

²[Comte de Du Buat-Nançay], Remarques d'un Français, ou examen impartial du livre de M. Necker sur l'administration des finances de France, pour servir de correctif et de supplément à son ouvrage (Geneva, 1785), pp. 168-76; De Coppons, op. cit., I, 30-31; Anon., Les Francs (1785), pp. 1 and 31-32.

³De l'administration des finances de la France (1784), in Oeuvres, V, 448.

Necker had expressed in his still earlier publications--namely, that the well-being of the English people was like the credit of the government attributable to their representative constitution.¹ But, countered his critics, what was the advantage of a national assembly, when the per capita debt in England was so much greater than it was in France² (as was universally believed in that country), and why was the poor-tax so enormous in England if the people were as happy as he said they were?³

About the same time as the attack upon Necker--that is, during the first half of the decade--conservative apologists likewise took up their pens against reformers of judicial procedure who looked to England for their models. One Boucher d'Argis, a counsellor at the court known as the Châtelet in Paris, published a book in which, though conceding that the rigor and complexity of the criminal law should be modified, he took a stand particularly against public trials. Public criminal trials, he argued, would injure the reputation of the defendant, lead to the intimidation of the judges, and permit the escape of accomplices.⁴ This question provoked the counsellor to the following burst of anti-English rhetoric:

Must we always set a rival nation above our own country, and because an abuse has there been consecrated by long usage erect it into a work of wisdom? Has reason located her empire only on the banks of the Thames? It seems that Anglomania today is extended over all things alike; this taste for a foreign fashion has advanced by degrees from dress to customs (*moeurs*) and from customs to laws. . . . Let us leave her principles and customs to England. The multitude of crimes which are committed there with such frequent impunity ought to prevent us from praising or adopting her forms.⁵

The *Mercur de France*, which tended to be "philosophic" though at this time quite conservative politically, took exception to Boucher d'Argis' stand upon secrecy of trial, but otherwise said

¹Ibid., IV, 165-70.

²[De Coppons], Réponse au livre de M. Necker, sur l'administration des finances de la France, in Critique de la théorie et pratique de M. Necker, II, 127-28.

³Du Buat-Nançay, Remarques d'un Français, p. 153.

⁴[A.-J.] Boucher d'Argis, Observations sur les loix criminelles de France (Amsterdam and Paris, 1781), pp. 63-68.

⁵Ibid., pp. 56-62 and 69.

that his book could be read with interest and profit.¹

When the government actually undertook a measure of judicial reform in 1788, the move was incidental to a sweeping series of decrees of which the principal object was to destroy the political power of the parlements. The re-establishment of these bodies following the accession of Louis XVI had by no means terminated the hostility which had existed between the government and the magistracy. That persistent quarrel entered the last of its recurrent acute phases toward the end of the year 1787. The Parlement of Paris had successfully resisted important financial reforms designed to ward off imminent bankruptcy and to destroy the financial immunity of the privileged classes, including the parliamentary aristocracy. At the same time it had declared that only the estates-general of the kingdom--last convoked in 1614--could sanction a tax which, as in one of the reforms in question, was to be levied for an indefinite period. The government, to meet its immediate needs, determined to float a large loan. To conciliate the Parlement, it made known its intention of summoning the estates-general by 1792, but, still anticipating resistance from the court, it presented the loan edict for registration on November 19, 1787, by a kind of summary procedure which amounted to a lit de justice, the king being present and registration ordered without a vote being taken. The opposition was furious. Led by a prince of the blood, the Duc d'Orléans, it became bolder and more outspoken. It demanded the summoning of the estates-general by 1789. Much as in 1770, the controversy came to an impasse at last with the flat assertion by the magistrates of their alleged constitutional right not to register such edicts as they deemed contrary to the fundamental laws of the kingdom, one of which, it was declared, was the consent of the nation to taxation. Thereupon the government, in a lit de justice of May 8, 1788, instituted a reorganization of the judicial system. Politically, the most important of the reforms was one resembling that which had set up the "Maupeou parlement" in 1771. For the Parlement of Paris, which was virtually suppressed, there was substituted a Plenary Court of royal appointees to whom alone was given the power to register edicts. Throughout the country there arose an opposition to this act which seriously impeded the administra-

¹Mercure de France, May 11, 1782, pp. 78-88.

tion of justice, while revolts, some in defense of local privilege, others in advocacy of general and fundamental reform, occurred in several provinces. All dissatisfied parties for the moment combined with the parlementarians. The government, whose financial position had become yet more desperate, retreated. A decree of August 8, 1788, announced that the estates-general would be convoked on the first of the following May. Necker was recalled to the ministry and on his advice the parlements were restored to their former functions, which they reassumed with all the pretensions they had formerly upheld.¹

Throughout this controversy, pamphlets defending the government charged the parlements with Anglomania. This was not so much because of the parlements' demand for the convocation of the estates-general as because of the desire of the courts to play a political role in limiting the monarchy. As in 1770-71, they were again said to be aping the parliament of England. The anti-parliamentary pamphlets set forth the familiar conservative arguments to the effect that the English form of government was undesirable because unstable, and that in any case it was not appropriate to France.²

The most telling variant of the latter argument was one which pointed out that the parlements, though ostensibly speaking in the name of the nation, were really defending privilege, that they had been hostile to many enlightened measures, that they were corps intermédiaires in the sense used by Montesquieu; whereas in England there were no corps intermédiaires of any kind. This was the substance of one of Linguet's famous pamphlets.³ It

¹E. Glasson, Le parlement de Paris. Son rôle politique depuis le règne de Charles VII jusqu'à la révolution (2 vols.; Paris, 1901), II, 470-85; H. Carré, P. Sagnac, and E. Lavisse, La règne de Louis XVI (1774-1789), Vol. IX, Part I of Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Révolution, ed. Ernest Lavisse (9 vols.; Paris, 1900-[11]), pp. 336-64; Albert Mathiez, The French Revolution, trans. Catherine Alison Phillips (New York, 1928), pp. 24-33.

²[Ange Goudar], L'autorité des rois de France est indépendante de tout corps politique; elle étoit établie avant que les parlemens fussent créés (Amsterdam, 1788), pp. 67-68 and *passim*; Anon., Je m'en rapporte à tout le monde, ou réflexions impartiales sur les affaires actuelles (London, 1788), pp. 71-74 and 93-94.

³La France plus qu'angloise, ou, comparaison entre la procédure entamée à Paris le 25 septembre 1788 contre les ministres

is certainly more than a little incongruous to classify Linguet with the ultra-conservatives, for where they believed privilege natural to a monarchy, Linguet was condemning the privileged classes while he supported the monarchy. He had gone through a curious evolution, not typical of his contemporaries. Extremely hostile before the American war to representative government in general and to the English model in particular, Linguet became for a time, in consequence of an imprisonment in the Bastille, an intense Anglophile, and published an explicit retraction of his former opinions.¹ What Linguet, whose only consistency was to be always anti-aristocratic in his sympathies, now saw to admire particularly in England was not the balance of powers, but the degree to which the people participated in and controlled the government.² His new position, though Anglophile, was very close to the position of those usually anti-English writers who looked for inspiration to the Contrat social of Rousseau rather than to the Esprit des lois of Montesquieu. And yet, four years later, while still professing to admire the government of England because the people there were not oppressed by corps intermédiaires,³ he was saying, in reversion to his original tenets of political theory, that it was ridiculous to talk about law being the expression of the general will, that government everywhere, be it king alone or parliament and king together, was absolute and must be absolute.⁴ As for France, he was a defender there of the absolute monarchy, and while approving the convocation of the estates-general, did so, apparently, not because the estates-general would limit the monarch, but because he hoped for an alliance of the king and third estate against the privileged orders.⁵

Although the position of the parlements was usually de-

du roi de France, et le procès intenté à Londres en 1640, au comte de Strafford, principal ministre de Charles premier, roi d'Angleterre. Avec des réflexions sur le danger imminent dont les entreprises de la robe menacent la nation, et les particuliers (2d ed.; Brussels, 1788), pp. 114-22, 140 and passim.

¹Linguet, Annales politiques, civiles, et littéraires du dix-huitième siècle (hereafter cited as Annales de Linguet), XI (1784), 68-187.

²Ibid. ³La France plus qu'angloise, pp. 115-19.

⁴Annales de Linguet, XV (1788), 172 and 175.

⁵Ibid., pp. 216, 283, and 410, n.

nounced as Anglophile by partisans of the ministry, one sympathizer of the parlements, representing precisely the interests Linguet was fighting, defended the courts upon the ground that while they had no such pretension to liberty as had the parliament of England, they had shown themselves to be more truly its defenders. For they were accustomed to oppose the monarch as far as they could, whereas the parliament of England could be bought by the king for money. To this advocate of limited monarchy, whose sympathies were closer to those of ultra-conservatives, on the whole, than to the viewpoint of the new moderate conservatism which will be described presently, the English form of government was too popular.¹

With the restoration of the parlements in the fall of 1788, the general interest shifted from the status of the magistracy to the impending meeting of the estates-general. That meeting was looked upon with dread by conservative monarchists, because they read the future of France in terms of English history. While the estates-general would be useful in reducing the parlements to their true stature, wrote a commentator close to the royal court, they nevertheless would prove to be an unfortunate resource for the monarchy, for the example of England showed how they would limit royal authority.² Moreau, historiographer of France and long a mouth-piece of clerical conservatism, tells us that in the name of "that old constitution [of France] which it was desired to destroy because it was not the great charter of England," he remonstrated with the chancellor, Lamoignon, against the summoning of the estates.³

The announcement which had set the date of convocation for May 1, 1789, had precipitated a controversy over the organiza-

¹[Le chevalier Metternich de Cologne], Lettres historiques, politiques et critiques, sur les événements qui se sont passés depuis 1778 jusqu'à présent. Recueillies et publiées par un homme de lettres qui n'est d'aucune académie, ni pensionné par aucun roi, république, visir ou ministre quelconques (18 vols.; London, 1788-94), II, 186-87 and V, "Introduction," passim.

²M. de Lescure (ed.), Correspondance secrète, inédite, sur Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, la cour et la ville, de 1777 à 1792 (2 vols.; Paris, 1866), II, 248 (April 20, 1788). Cf. ibid., pp. 318 (Jan. 3, 1789) and 335 (March 6, 1789).

³Jacob-Nicolas Moreau, Mes souvenirs, ed. Camille Hermelin (2 vols.; Paris, 1898-1901), II, 360-64.

tion of the estates. There were two principal questions. The first was whether or not the third estate should have a representation equal numerically to the representation of the first and second estate (the clergy and nobility) together, a proposition which was known as the "doubling of the third." The second question was whether voting in the estates-general should be, as customarily, by order--in which case the first and second estates could be counted upon to side together against the third--or whether it should be "by head" in combined session. In the latter case, the votes of the liberal minority of the two upper orders would throw the balance to the third estate. Ultra-conservatives persisted in ascribing to English influences the demand of the third estate for political preponderance. One writer referred to all advocates of vote by head as Anglophiles,¹ which was certainly not the case. Séguier, solicitor-general at the Parlement of Paris, declared that there was nothing really wrong with the French monarchy, that factious persons and cosmopolitans were just making trouble, and that the third estate was putting forth unjust pretensions. He gloomily compared the France of 1788-89 with England at the time of the execution of Charles I.² Another writer, defending hoary custom in the convocation and organization of the estates-general, and taking as his text Montesquieu's dictum, no monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no monarch, similarly ascribed all the troubles of the country to the greed and ambition of the third estate. While his pamphlet purported to have been written by an Englishman and while it apostrophized the English minister William Pitt as a great conservative, it was only pseudo-Anglophile, since its true sense lay rather in objection to the example of England, which was repudiated both as irrelevant to French conditions and as bad in an absolute sense, than in admiration for Pitt.³ Another writer who held out for ancient custom in

¹[Abbé Charles de Gourcy], Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen dans les circonstances présentes, avec un jugement impartial sur l'ouvrage de M. l'abbé de Mably. Par un citoyen ami des trois ordres ... (1789), p. 29.

²Façon de voir d'une bonne vieille, qui ne radote pas encore [ca. end of 1788], pp. 1-2 and passim.

³Anon., Fragment d'une lettre écrite à M. Pitt. Par un Anglais (1789), pp. 1-23.

the organization of the estates-general claimed that vote by order was necessary not only to preserve the monarchical character of the constitution but to avoid "ministerial despotism." In respect to the latter purpose, the English House of Commons, which this writer apparently assumed to be practically equivalent to the English parliament (as had indeed been the older tendency in France), showed clearly that individuals were easily accessible to ministerial influence. The author thought that legislative collectivities such as the French orders would exhibit more resistance to this influence than would individuals.¹

Thus to ultra-conservatives Anglophile ideas remained, even in 1789, republican and egalitarian--the one qualification implied the other. This opinion was not entirely mistaken. Contemporaries remarked upon a great revival of Anglomania after the American Revolution,² and there can be no doubt that much of it was in the older liberal Anglophile tradition. Anglophile liberalism had for a competitor, however, the newer doctrine of popular sovereignty. A previous chapter has already traced the origin

¹Anon., Réflexions impartiales sur la grande question qui partage les esprits, concernant les droits du roi et de la nation assemblée en états-généraux (1789), pp. 6-16.

²Caraccioli, Les entretiens du palais-royal, I, 6-7; Journal inédit du duc de Croÿ 1718-1784, ed. Vicomte de Grouchy and Paul Cottin (4 vols.; Paris, 1906-7), IV, 303; [Michel Servan], Apologie de la Bastille. Pour servir de réponse aux mémoires de M. Linguet sur la Bastille ... Par un homme en pleine campagne (Kehl and Lausanne, 1784), pp. 53-55; [Jacques Lescène des Maisons], Histoire politique de la révolution en France, ou correspondance entre Lord D*** et Lord T** (2 vols.; London, 1789), I, 6-10; Marquis de Condorcet, Lettres d'un bourgeois de New-Haven [usually written "New-Heaven"] à un citoyen de Virginie, sur l'inutilité de partager le pouvoir législatif entre plusieurs corps (1787), in Oeuvres de Condorcet, ed. A. Condorcet O'Connor and M. F. Arago (12 vols.; Paris, 1847-49), IX, 75; [P.-S. Dupont de Nemours], Lettre à la chambre du commerce de Normandie; sur le mémoire qu'elle a publié relativement au traité de commerce avec l'Angleterre (Rouen and Paris, 1788), p. 248; Jean-Paul Marat to the President of the Estates-General, Aug. 23, 1789, La correspondance de Marat, ed. Charles Vellay, p. 100; Comte de Ségur, Mémoires ou souvenirs et anecdotes (3d ed.; 3 vols.; Paris, 1827), II, 30-31; Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'outre-tombe, ed. Biré, I, 232, quoted in Alphonse Aulard, The French Revolution, a Political History 1789-1804, trans. Bernard Miall (4 vols.; New York, 1910), I, note, 113; Dominique-Joseph Garat, Mémoires historiques sur la vie de M. Suard, sur ses écrits, et sur le XVIII^e siècle (2 vols.; Paris, 1820), II, 319; Année littéraire, 1787, II, 83.

and early history of this doctrine, a critique of Anglophile liberalism to which the two most influential contributors were Rousseau and Mably: Rousseau because of his concept of the sovereignty of the general will, Mably because of his notion of the complete separation of powers in government and his insistence upon virtue rather than self-interest as the only acceptable principle of political action. Sometimes it seemed as if competition would give way to the merging of the idea of popular sovereignty with the older liberal tradition. The journalist Brissot, who praised the constitution of Pennsylvania above that of England because it provided for a greater measure of popular control in government,¹ thought nevertheless that the English government was good enough to be an inspiration to the French, not only on account of its achievements in civil liberty but also on account of its principle of the conflict and balance of parties. Brissot vindicated this principle as the source of the virtue of mixed or republican governments, against those who pointed to English party strife as an argument against the English constitution.² Involved in 1787 in the ambition of the Duc d'Orléans and the Marquis du Crest to create an opposition party in France, Brissot gave them advice à l'anglais. They must, he said, like the leaders of the English opposition, render themselves agreeable to the people, redoubtable to the ministry, and necessary to the king. For Brissot expected to see a typically English political system emerge from the convocation of the estates-general.³ Lanjuinais, the notable Breton champion of the third estate both in his province and in the forthcoming National Constituent Assembly, wrote as late as October, 1788:

We reject with equal horror democracy . . . aristocracy . . . and despotism. But we cherish that mixed form so much desired by ancient statesmen, so much applauded by the moderns, wherein from the concourse of king, magnates, and people acting through its representatives will come decisions of

¹J. P. Brissot (ed.), Bibliothèque philosophique du législateur, du politique, du jurisconsulte (10 vols.; Berlin and Paris, 1782-85), III, 254-57.

²J. P. Brissot, Tableau de l'état présent des sciences et des arts en Angleterre, I, No. 1 (Jan. 1784), 32.

³Brissot to the Marquis du Crest [Aug. 1787], in J. P. Brissot, Correspondance et papiers, ed. Claude Perroud (Paris [1912]), pp. 152-54.

a general and constant will.¹

Other and similar references might be cited.²

But important influences were operating to counteract the merging of the doctrine of popular sovereignty with Anglophile liberalism. One of these was the influence of America, the new, independent America. While it was not very infrequent for people to admire, as did Brissot, both England and America, their admiration was often with some shade of difference in favor of the latter country. On the whole, the principles of the new American governments can be said to have fortified the critique of English government set forth by the popular school. The state constitutions signified usually both a more democratic representation than that of England, and the superiority of the legislature to the executive in place of an equal distribution of legislative power, while even civil liberty was sometimes pictured as more secure in America than it was in England.³ The Federal Constitution of 1787

¹J.-D. Lanjuinais, Le préservatif contre l'avis à mes compatriotes (October, 1788), in Oeuvres de J.-D. Lanjuinais, pair de France, membre de l'institut, etc., ed. Victor Lanjuinais (4 vols.; Paris, 1832), IV, 142.

²Madame Roland, De la liberté [written in 1778], in Oeuvres de J. M. Ph. Roland, femme de l'ex-ministre de l'intérieur ..., ed. L.-A. Champagnoux (3 vols.; Paris, Year VIII [1796-97]), III, 170; Madame Roland, Voyage en Angleterre [written in 1784], ibid., pp. 213-53; Madame Roland to Bosc, Aug. 13, 1784, Lettres de Madame Roland (1780-1793), ed. Claude Perroud (2 vols.; Paris, 1901-2), I, 455; same to same, Feb. 27 [1786], ibid., p. 567; J.-A.-J. Cérutti, Les jardins de Betz [written in 1785], p. 40, in Oeuvres diverses de M. Cérutti, ou recueil de pièces composées avant et depuis la révolution (2 vols.; Paris, 1792), Vol. II; [J.-N. Billaud-Varenne], Despotisme des ministres de France, ou exposition des principes et moyens employés par l'aristocratie, pour mettre la France dans les fers (3 vols.; Amsterdam and Paris, 1789), I, 156 and III, 39-44 [written about 1787]; [Rabaut Saint-Étienne], À la nation française, sur les vices de son gouvernement; sur la nécessité d'établir une constitution; et sur la composition des états-généraux (Nov. 1788 [first published in June, 1788]), p. 30; Duc de Chartres, as quoted in [Métra, J. Imbert et al.], Correspondance secrète, politique et littéraire, ou mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des cours, des sociétés et de la littérature en France, depuis la mort de Louis XV (18 vols.; London, 1787-89), XIV, 342-43 (May 21, 1783).

³Mably, Observations sur le gouvernement et les lois des États-Unis d'Amérique, in Collection complète des oeuvres de l'abbé de Mably (15 vols.; Paris, 1794-95), VIII, 350 and 382-83; Brissot, Bibliothèque philosophique, III, 254-57; Condorcet, De l'influence de la révolution d'Amérique sur l'Europe (1786), in Oeuvres, VIII, 16-17; Condorcet, Lettres d'un bourgeois de New-

did service for both Anglophile and anti-English arguments, depending on whether the writer chose to emphasize the fact that it provided for an upper house and an executive veto,¹ or whether he chose to emphasize the fact that the upper house was not hereditary and the executive veto only suspensive.² But the appellation of "American" was appropriated by those who in 1789, like Lafayette and Brissot, supported a suspensive veto and a non-hereditary upper chamber (which with Brissot was for discussion only). They probably had a right to the name, since they singled out in the American federal constitution that which was supposed to be different from usage in the English constitution, and since they were frequently the same writers who had contrasted the American state constitutions with the English constitution, to the discredit of the latter and the praise of the former.

While the American example was thus made a part of the popular-sovereignty critique of Anglophile ideas, it added very little, in the way of political technique or analysis, that was

Haven, ibid., Vol. IX, passim; [Jerome Pétion de Villeneuve], Avis aux François sur le salut de la patrie (1788), pp. 92-94; [William Livingston], Examen du gouvernement d'Angleterre, comparé aux constitutions des États-Unis. Où l'on réfute quelques assertions contenues dans l'ouvrage de M. Adams, intitulé: Apologie des constitutions des États-Unis d'Amérique, et dans celui de M. Delolme, intitulé: De la constitution d'Angleterre [trans. Fabre and ed. Dupont de Nemours et al.] (London and Paris, 1789), passim; Mercure de France, May 23, 1789, pp. 156-57, reviewing Livingston, op. cit.; J. de Chénier, Dénonciation des inquisiteurs de la pensée (Paris, 1789), p. 58; Lafayette to Hamilton, May 25, 1788, papers of Alexander Hamilton, Library of Congress; Lanjuinais, quoted in the Journal des débats et des décrets, No. 13 (Sept. 7, 1789), p. 2.

¹Rabaut Saint-Étienne, À la nation française, pp. 28-32; [François Soulès], Le véritable patriotisme (1788), pp. 13-17 and 30-33; N. Bergasse, Lettre de M. Bergasse, sur les états généraux (1789), pp. 28-33; Cérutti, Vues générales sur la constitution française, ou exposé des droits de l'homme dans l'ordre naturel, social et monarchique (Paris, 1789), p. 157 in Oeuvres diverses, Vol. I; Anon., Lettre d'un Suisse aux Français, pour concilier les trois ordres (Berne, 1789), pp. 26-27.

²Lafayette, Mémoires, correspondance et manuscrits du général Lafayette, publiés par sa famille (6 vols.; Paris, 1837-38), III, 202-3 and IV, 187; Eloise Ellery, Brissot de Warville. A Study in the History of the French Revolution (Boston and New York, 1915), pp. 127 and 130; Marat to the President of the Estates-General, Aug. 23, 1789, in Correspondance de Marat, p. 100; [J. G. Peltier], La trompette du jugement (Sept. 1, 1789), pp. 26 and 30. Cf. publication of the American Federal Constitution in Livingston, Examen du gouvernement d'Angleterre.

definitely new. The principal contribution was the idea of the constitutional convention. The newness of the idea was in the distinction between the convention and the legislature. The history of English constitutional development was based, according to French thinking, upon the same idea of contract as that which underlay the notion of the constitutional convention, but in English history there was no super-legislature with a special mandate to make the "fundamental" laws. The distinction between convention and legislature, however, was not considered as an adverse criticism of the English custom until very late, and then was it only slightly adverse.¹ For after all, the National Constituent Assembly itself was to meet first as a legislature; it would change its name and organization but not its personnel, and it would not seek another mandate.

Probably the main contribution of the new America to French ideas about the English constitution was not the substitution of another model for that of England but a certain stimulation of the rationalist proclivities of French thought.² The influence of America was to make men more critical of the use of any historical examples. Disregarding the fact that the American constitutions were in large part the outgrowth of colonial experience, Frenchmen observed only that in certain respects they differed from the constitution of England, and the founding fathers were thought of as having sat themselves down in Arcady to correct a historical pattern, the English pattern, in the light of reason. Why should not Frenchmen do the same? Surely, for this task the eighteenth century, the most enlightened of the Christian era, had produced wisdom enough and to spare.

Perhaps, at the outset, the popular school had been not much more rationalist or less historical than the Anglophiles, but in the decade before the Revolution the argument from rationalism became very conspicuous with the disciples of Rousseau and Mably. It was alternated judiciously with the argument from his-

¹ Mercure de France, May 23, 1789, pp. 160-64, reviewing Livingston, Examen du gouvernement d'Angleterre; Emmanuel Sieyès, Dire de l'abbé Sieyès, sur la question du veto royal, à la séance du 7 septembre 1789 (Paris [1789]), pp. 20-23.

² Cf. R. R. Palmer, "The French Idea of American Independence on the Eve of the French Revolution" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1934), passim.

tory: history showed what bad results would be entailed in the adoption of English forms of government; rationalism dictated that the French consult, not a historical example, but their own enlightened intelligence.

Meanwhile, the theoretical development of the doctrines of the popular school was carried on in the 1780's by a number of writers who showed little of the disposition we have seen in other publicists to make a compromise between the doctrine of the general will and Anglophile liberalism. Rousseau's Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, which decried the irresponsibility of the English parliament to the electorate¹ was first published, though written ten years earlier, in 1782. In 1784 Mably published his Observations sur le gouvernement et les lois des États-Unis d'Amérique, in which he denounced the royal veto, affirmed the plan of representation by geographical districts as in America to be superior to that of "virtual representation" which obtained in England, and asserted that, were it not for English jurisprudence, English liberty would now be entirely destroyed.² One of Mably's earliest works, the famous Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen, which in general declared the prerogatives of the English crown to be far too extensive, was first published in 1789.³ In the Marquis de Condorcet, future Girondin and last of the great "philosophers," a new aspect of the ideological development of the popular school was clearly manifested. About the middle of the decade Condorcet began to write political tracts in which he showed himself to be at once a Physiocrat and a disciple of Rousseau. That alliance of ideas had been visible, though less extensively worked out, in Turgot,⁴ to whom Condorcet had been very close. The Physiocrats, it will be remembered,⁵ had split, some, like the Abbé Baudeau and the Marquis de Mirabeau, continuing to profess the doctrine of legal despotism, others like Turgot, Condorcet, and Dupont de Nemours espousing, in more or less approximation to the ideas of Rousseau, the concept of

¹See above, p. 28.

²Observations sur le gouvernement et les lois des États-Unis d'Amérique, in Oeuvres, VIII, 350 and 382-83.

³Oeuvres, XI, 259-518.

⁴See above, p. 41.

⁵Ibid.

the sovereignty of the nation. Both groups continued to be anti-English, but where Baudeau and the Marquis de Mirabeau were found to be hobnobbing perforce with old-fashioned political conservatives,¹ to whose ideas indeed Physiocracy had always had some relation, Condorcet and Dupont de Nemours belonged to those elements which in 1789 constituted the political left wing.

Physiocracy and the doctrine of popular sovereignty had a common ground especially in opposition to a division of legislative authority. Such a division ran counter to the views upon enlightenment and upon political virtue professed, respectively, by the Physiocrats and by the school of Rousseau. Whatever liberty the English enjoyed, said Condorcet, was owing, not to the division of legislative power in their constitution, but to their laws relative to civil liberty and to the enlightened public opinion which supported them.² The division of legislative authority put a premium upon party, which to Condorcet meant faction. There being no advancement but in attachment to party, party therefore must dominate almost all members of parliament.³ The spirit of party was opposed to disinterested legislation. For example, the Physiocratic principle of a single tax levied upon the income from land, a reform which would be of inestimable benefit to the English nation, was disagreeable to the politicians, simply because they would lose the immense patronage involved in the collection of taxes under the present complicated system of excise and tariff duties. Of course, said Condorcet, the mercantile interest favored these restrictive taxes too, but the mercantile interest would be insufficient to secure their maintenance without the support of the great proprietors, who were the politicians that ruled the nation.⁴ Condorcet pointed to other melancholy examples of the alleged effect of party interest. Only read the debates in parliament, he said, on parliamentary

¹[Nicolas Baudeau], Idées d'un citoyen presque sexagénaire sur l'état actuel du royaume de France, comparées à celles de sa jeunesse (Paris, 1787), Part III, pp. 17-29; the Marquis de Mirabeau to the Bailli de Mirabeau, June 19, 1787, "Lettres inédites du marquis de Mirabeau (1787-1789)," Le Correspondant, CCL (1913), 267; same to same, Aug. 9, 1787, ibid., p. 275; same to same, Feb. 9, 1789, ibid., CCLI (1913), 317; same to same, April 28, 1789, ibid., p. 327.

²Lettres d'un bourgeois de New-Haven, in Oeuvres, IX, 75-76.

³Ibid., pp. 86-88.

⁴Ibid., pp. 89-90.

reform, the liquidation of the national debt, and Charles Fox's bill for the reform of the East India Company, and observe with what a mass of sophisms these matters were argued, obscuring the real issues.¹ Making the same point in another way, Condorcet brought out the idea that a government in which legislative authority was divided was a complicated government. Only through simplicity in political organization, he declared, could the truth and the public interest prevail.²

In both Physiocracy and the doctrine of popular sovereignty the idea of national unity was prominent. In the one it was an economic and cultural unity, in the other a unity founded upon political virtue or the general will. Condorcet showed throughout his work the influence of both concepts. Reference will be made in a later connection³ to the influence upon the liberalism of the 1780's of that Physiocratic sentiment of nationalism which had formerly been one of the features distinguishing Physiocracy from other liberal doctrines.

In one respect there was a conflict between Condorcet as a Physiocrat and Condorcet as a member of the popular school. It was difficult to reconcile Physiocracy as an élite doctrine with the democratic tendencies of the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Condorcet had the same extreme distrust of the "populace" that Turgot had had. The populace in England exercised too direct an influence upon elections⁴ and too much influence upon the course of affairs in parliament, where the members had felt it to their interest to defer to the prejudices of the masses rather than to oppose those prejudices. Condorcet censured parliament for not having cut away the evil influence of the populace at the root by dividing cities into quarters, establishing freedom of trade, and sponsoring public education.⁵ The Gordon riots of June, 1780, which occurred in protest against legislation removing certain Catholic disabilities, had made a great impression on him.⁶

¹Ibid., p. 87. ²Ibid., p. 75. ³See below, p. 142.

⁴Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provinciales (1788), in Oeuvres, VIII, 156; Vie de Voltaire (1789), ibid., IV, 115.

⁵Lettres d'un bourgeois de New-Haven, in Oeuvres, IX, 90; Idées sur le despotisme à l'usage de ceux qui prononcent ce mot sans l'entendre (1789), ibid., pp. 161-63.

⁶De l'influence de la révolution d'Amérique, in Oeuvres,

Yet Condorcet professed a belief in political equality, too. His reconciliation of these attitudes lay not in advocating a more restricted franchise than that which the English possessed, but a system of indirect election such as was employed for the provincial assemblies set up in France in 1788,¹ bodies which Condorcet thought of as providing a machinery for the election of a national assembly.² Condorcet thus believed that the upper classes were better qualified to look after the interest of the lower classes than the lower classes were themselves. But that was the closest that he came to entertaining the ideas of a hierarchical social organization based upon landed property which had given classic Physiocracy a considerable following among the nobility. He was strongly opposed to class representation in government. Even the English House of Lords, in which, he believed, membership was desired chiefly for vanity's sake, tended, he said, to create and perpetuate a patrician class, distinct from the rest of the nation.³

Condorcet's association of Anglophile ideas with class interest indicated a new emphasis of the popular school which developed toward the end of the decade. This new approach was in large part caused by the rise of a moderate conservatism which employed Anglophile ideology. It was this new conservatism which contributed as much as anything that had gone before to the damning of the name of Anglophile in the ears of liberals.

Moderate conservatism accepted the idea of limited monarchy. Its point of view was expressed theoretically by Delolme's concept of the crown in England as the keystone of that tripartite balance of power--king, lords, and commons--which according to that writer so perfectly preserved both the liberties of the subject and the public tranquillity. Nothing more aptly illustrates the transformation of Anglophile attitudes than this appreciation

VIII, 48; Avertissements insérés par Condorcet dans l'édition complète des oeuvres de Voltaire [1785-89], ibid., IV, 352.

¹Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provinciales, in Oeuvres, VIII, 156-57.

²Ibid., pp. 221-58.

³Ibid., pp. 155-57; Lettres d'un bourgeois de New-Haven, ibid., IX, 81-82.

of the thesis of Delolme, whose work had in the 1770's been regarded as nothing more than an essay upon government by contract and the right of resistance.¹ While it is true that the latter concepts were included by Delolme in his analysis of the English constitution,² it is also true that his real tendency was conservative,³ and that his principal thesis was the one which was emphasized in the 1780's.

The new Anglomania, which began to be evident about the middle of the decade, was related to the frondeur Anglomania of the grands seigneurs before the American Revolution, but represents the addition of another set of reasons to those formerly held for admiring English institutions. Whereas the grands seigneurs had previously desired a limited monarchy on the English model in order to increase their own political power at the king's expense, they now began to think of the English constitution not only as a means of getting political power but of maintaining it and even their privileges against the encroachments of the third estate. In the eyes of both the proponents and the critics of the revised Anglophile ideology the House of Lords, formerly eclipsed by the House of Commons, took on a new lease of life. In the legislative trinity the House of Lords became a significant third and the model for a French upper chamber desired not only by the grands seigneurs but by gentlemen and by bourgeois conservatives, who, though they did not favor aristocratic govern-

¹[Louis Bachaumont et al.], Mémoires secrets pour servir à l'histoire de la république des lettres en France, depuis MDCCLXII jusqu'à nos jours; ou Journal d'un observateur ... (36 vols.; London, 1784-89), VI, 31-33 (Nov. 11, 1771). Cf. Madame Roland (then Mlle Philpon) to the Cannet sisters, Jan. 5, 1777, in Claude Perroud (ed.), Lettres de Madame Roland, nouvelle série 1767-1780 (2 vols.; Paris, 1913-15), II, 5-9; [François] Lacombe, Tableau de Londres et de ses environs, avec un précis de la constitution de l'Angleterre, et de sa décadence (London and Brussels, 1784), pp. 145-67. The second edition of this latter work had appeared in 1780. Gabriel Bonno, in La constitution britannique devant l'opinion française ... (Paris, 1932), gives 1777 for the edition used by him.

²Jean Louis Delolme, The Constitution of England, or an Account of the English Government; in Which It Is Compared with the Republican Form of Government, and Occasionally with the Other Monarchies in Europe (new ed.; London, 1777), Bk. I, chap. iii, p. 61, and Bk. II, chap. xiv, p. 270.

³Ibid., Bk. II, chaps. x and xviii, passim.

ment, favored democracy still less. Their hope was, moreover, that the king would hold the balance of power between the aristocracy and the third estate instead of forming an alliance with the aristocracy.

A factor of prime importance in the new French appreciation of things English was the conservative and national revival in England after the close of the American war. In 1784 the king's choice for prime minister, William Pitt the Younger, was, after striving for weeks to carry on the government against a hostile Whig majority in the House of Commons, sustained by the country in a general election. For the next few years the Pitt ministry sponsored a number of constructive commercial and financial policies, some of which it put through parliament. With the new type of French conservative, royal government in England began to enjoy a prestige it certainly had lacked in France while served by the ministries of the two preceding decades. The electioneering of 1784 was described at length in French papers in such a way that political morality appeared to be quite wanting,¹ but the new Anglophiles paid no attention. To them the crown, whose preponderance (when the crown had been thought of as preponderant) had formerly been supposed to be the consequence of political corruption, now appeared to be, not indeed preponderant, but powerful equally with the other branches of the government and deriving its power from the very nature of the constitution.² Whereas the crown had formerly been thought of as constantly opposed to the national interest, it now seemed, thanks to the Pitt ministry, beneficent. Whereas the king of England had formerly been, in the opinion of Frenchmen, neither loved nor revered by

¹Courier de l'Europe, XV, 195 (March 26, 1784); Journal historique et politique des principaux événements des différentes cours de l'Europe (hereafter cited as Journal de Genève), 1784, II, 79-80; Journal encyclopédique, 1784, IV, 179.

²Mémoires du marquis de Bouillé, ed. MM. Berville and Barrière ("Collection des mémoires relatifs à la Révolution française," XLV) (2d ed.; Paris, 1822), pp. 23-26; Mallet du Pan, in Journal de Genève, 1784, I, 425-27, and in Journal de politique et de littérature, contenant les principaux événements de toutes les cours; les nouvelles de la république des lettres, etc. (hereafter cited as Journal politique de Bruxelles; otherwise known as the Mercur politique), Jan. 1, 1785, "Tableau politique de l'Europe en 1784," pp. 4-9. At this time, both the Journal de Genève and the Journal politique de Bruxelles were under the editorship of Mallet du Pan.

his subjects, a less "republican" idea of the English attitude toward kings now began to make its way. One may note the appearance, significant enough, of a French translation of an English pamphlet which dwelt upon the veneration of the English for King George III.¹

For some years after the close of the American war, there was no open conflict between the Anglophiles, whether of the old liberal or the new conservative persuasion, and the popular school. These different elements were, in fact, allies, devoted to the attainment of a common end, the destruction of royal absolutism. It is unnecessary to review all the events in that struggle; suffice it to say that the resistance of the monarchy was broken when in the summer of 1788 it agreed to summon the estates-general the following year and to restore to the parlements the political functions of which they had been deprived by the recent judicial reform. Thereupon the allies fell apart, for the judicial aristocracy and the grands seigneurs inaugurated a counter-revolution, standing out against the "doubling of the third" and vote by head in the forthcoming estates-general.

Since the government itself soon decided for the doubling of the third, the main issue became that of vote by head or vote by order. This question continued to occupy the public throughout the spring of 1789, while the elections of the deputies were taking place. Further, it constituted the principal question within the estates-general itself from the moment of its assembling at Versailles on May 5 until, on June 27, ten days after the Third Estate had proclaimed itself to be the National Assembly of the kingdom, the upper two orders, with the king's grudging consent, joined the third to form one body. In the pamphlets that were showered on France during these months spokesmen for the privileged classes pronounced either for the retention of the customary organization into three estates, or for a bicameral assembly with the clergy and nobility united into an upper house. While only the latter proposition bore any close resemblance to the English model, sometimes those who advocated the retention of three separate orders invoked the example of England also,

¹[Sir Nathaniel William Wraxall], Coup d'oeil sur l'état politique de la Grande-Bretagne, au commencement de l'année 1787, trans. from the English (London, 1787), passim.

since the principle of the division of legislative power between nobility and commoners was involved in the one case as in the other.¹

A number of spokesmen for a conservative bourgeois ideal of strong monarchy and a balance of power between the aristocracy and the third estate likewise came out for a bicameral arrangement.² But so great was the class cleavage at this time, so united was the third estate, so keenly did it feel that if the principle of corporate voting were retained the privileged orders would still be in the saddle and nothing would be accomplished, that the demand for a unicameral estates-general was overwhelming. Some publicists who had only recently been advocating a constitution on the English model changed their minds,³ or at least showed

¹Comte d'Antraigues, À l'ordre de la noblesse du Bas-Vivara [Paris, 1789], pp. 23, 41, and *passim*; Comte de Lauraguais, Dissertation sur les assemblées nationales, sous les trois races des rois de France (Paris, Oct. 10, 1788), pp. 12-13, 83, and 91; Lauraguais, referred to in Journal général de l'Europe, Première partie. Politique, commerce, agriculture, 1789, I, 20; [C. G. de La Luzerne], évêque-duc de Langres, Sur la forme d'opiner aux états-généraux (1789), pp. 7-29, 92, and 106-8, in Affaires d'état, Vol. S; [C.-A.] de Calonne, Lettre adressée au roi (London [1789]), pp. 62, 67-68, 137, and 282; [J.-J. Duval D'Épremesnil?] Réflexions d'un magistrat sur la question du nombre, et celle de l'opinion par ordre ou par tête [1788], quoted by Servan in Réflexions d'un magistrat ... suivies des remarques d'un pauvre tiers incrédule, in his Recueil de pièces intéressantes pour servir à l'histoire de la révolution de 1789, en France (2 vols.; 1789), II, 181-87.

²Lescène des Maisons, Histoire politique de la Révolution en France, I, 161 and II, 150-53; [J.-B. Huet de Froberville], Catéchisme des trois ordres, pour les assemblées d'élection. Par un gentilhomme françois (Jan. 1789), pp. 31-32; Bergasse, Lettre de M. Bergasse, sur les états généraux, pp. 5-6, 13-18, and 23-33; Anon., Lettre d'un suisse aux français, pp. 3-5, 10, 16-17, and 20-27; Anon., Réflexions sur la question de savoir si on opinera par ordre ou par tête [May 6, 1789], pp. 2-6; Anon., Les vices découverts, ou avis à mes concitoyens, sur quelques objets importants, relatifs à l'état présent des affaires ("In France," 1789), pp. 35-36, n. 24; [Mignonneau], Considérations intéressantes sur les affaires présentes (2d ed.; London and Paris, 1788), pp. 2-3, 26-30, 70-75, and 78-88.

³Cérutti, Observations rapides sur la lettre de M. de Calonne au roi, pp. 59-63, and Exhortation à la concorde, envoyé aux états-généraux sous le nom du roi, pp. 26-27, both in Oeuvres diverses, Vol. I; Cf. [Rabaut Saint-Étienne], Question de droit public: doit-on recueillir les voix, dans les états-généraux, par ordres, ou par têtes de délibérans? Par l'auteur des Considérations sur les intérêts du tiers-état (Languedoc, 1789), pp. 48-54 and *passim*, with his À la nation française, pp. 28-45.

definite signs of swinging over to an anti-English opinion.¹

A relativist type of argument, such as had been common before the Revolution with the older type of conservatism, was now for the first time employed by liberals to combat the conservatism of the moderates. The existence in France of a privileged nobility was contrasted with the absence of such a class in England, where the peerage had political power only. It was said that to confer such political power upon the French nobility prior to the establishment of equality before the law would be to reproduce in France, not the English form of government, but only a travesty of it. This argument was set forth most vigorously by Jean-Joseph Mounier, one of the leaders of the provincial revolution of 1788 in Dauphiné and later the principal author of the Anglophile draft constitution in the National Constituent Assembly.² Once public and individual liberty was established in fundamental laws, Mounier maintained, foreshadowing his future Anglophile position, then but only then would wisdom commend a balance of power in government.³

The popular party made very considerable use of the argument based upon the differences between France and England, during both the controversy over the organization of the Estates-General and the debate in the summer of 1789 over the proposed incorporation in the new constitution of a royal veto and a bicameral legislature. Fundamentally, the second controversy was only a continuation of the first. The popular party extended the relativist argument from the issue of a separate political representation for the aristocracy to that of the degree of authority the king should have. The great size and continental position of France, it was said, demanded that the king, who would naturally wield the executive power, be able to command a very large army, whereas the army commanded by the king of England was, on account of the lesser extent of the country and its insular

¹Cf. Lanjuinais, Réflexions patriotiques sur l'arrêté de quelques nobles de Bretagne, daté du 25 octobre 1788, in Oeuvres, IV, 110-23, with his Le préservatif contre l'avis à mes compatriotes, ibid., p. 142.

²Nouvelles observations sur les états-généraux de France (1789), pp. 245-51.

³Ibid., p. 248.

immunity from attack, comparatively small. To confide to the king of France, when he had a great army at his disposal, a prerogative as extensive as that of the king of England, to construct the government in such a fashion as to enable him to utilize the aristocracy and corruptible members of the bourgeoisie for ends which history, both French and English, taught would be despotic ends, would be to make him much more powerful actually than the king of England.¹ The Abbé Sieyes, one of the most famous pamphleteers of the Assembly, introduced an unusual idea into this argument by explaining that whereas the absolute veto was necessary in England to safeguard the royal prerogative, since in England the legislative and constituent powers were identical, no such consideration need be of weight in France, where the legislative and constituent powers would be separate.²

In all the constitutional discussions of 1789, royalty and aristocracy appeared as two aspects of a single issue, even though at a given time one might be more conspicuous than the other. Further, the idea that the principal and constant opponent of the nation was the monarch, an idea which had run all through eighteenth-century French interpretations of English history, was persistently applied by the popular party to the revolution in France, even to its social aspects. While the popular party in

¹[G.-J.-B. Target], II^e suite de l'écrit intitulé: les états-généraux convoqués par Louis XVI [Paris, 1789], pp. 2 and 39-40; Anon., Discours de l'orateur des trois ordres, aux états-généraux. Par un député (1789), pp. 24-25 and 30; [Abbé Joseph-André Brun], Le point de ralliement des citoyens françois, sur les bases d'une constitution nationale, et sur les pouvoirs des députés (1789), pp. 136-39; Anon., Des droits du citoyen, et de leur réunion avec une bonne constitution. Par R***. J**., député particulier du diocèse de Lodeve (1789), pp. 24-27; [Philippe-Antoine Grouvelle], De l'autorité de Montesquieu dans la révolution présente (1789), p. 122 and n.; Sieyes, Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?, ed. Edmé Champion (Paris, 1888), pp. 59-60, 63 and n. 60 [first published anonymously in 1789]; Anon., Plan d'une constitution nouvelle, convenable à la nation françoise [Paris, 1789], notes, pp. 13-16; Maximilien Robespierre, Dire de M. de Robespierre, député de la province d'Artois à l'Assemblée nationale, contre le veto royal, soit absolu, soit suspensif [Sept. 1789], p. 13; Joseph Barnave, in Journal des débats, No. 7 (Sept. 2, 1789), p. 6; Alexandre de Lameth, ibid., No. 9 (Sept. 3, 1789), p. 5; De Leipand, ibid., No. 7 (Sept. 2, 1789), p. 5.

²Dire de l'abbé Sieyes, sur la question du veto royal, pp. 20-23.

1789 was above all afraid of social counter-revolution and refused therefore to countenance a political arrangement which would leave the aristocracy in too favorable a position, nevertheless it customarily argued in terms of how such an arrangement would be utilized by the king. Of course, this mode of thinking, even though to a great extent traditional, was not entirely inappropriate to the circumstances. It was an answer to the Anglophiles, who were also stressing the royal position in the constitution. The popular party took no stock in the hope of the Anglophiles that the king would hold the balance of power between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. The history of France in the past two centuries indicated to them that the monarchy and privilege were naturally allied, even if it sometimes seemed that the alliance was only a modus vivendi. Montesquieu himself had said they were allied, and liberals were beginning to declare that Montesquieu was really an aristocratic conservative at heart¹ rather than an admirer of the "republic hidden under the form of monarchy"² as his famous description of the government of England had generally led men to think. The judgment of the popular party as to the anti-national character of the French king's inclinations was in their own eyes at least confirmed by what seemed, after June, 1789 especially, to be an alliance of the court and the privileged classes for the purpose of intimidating the National Constituent Assembly. The Anglophile bourgeoisie, they thought, might be sincere in their position, but surely the Anglophile aristocracy had their tongues in their cheeks, knowing that the king would be upon their side.

It was, however, the inadequacy of the critique of English

¹Grouvelle, De l'autorité de Montesquieu, pp. 92, 98, and passim; "Lettre de M. Helvétius au président de Montesquieu, sur son manuscrit de l'Esprit des loix," Lettres de M. Helvétius au président de Montesquieu et à M. Saurin, relatives à l'aristocratie de la noblesse (1789), passim. See appendix below in regard to the apocryphal character of this letter, as well as of the letter of Helvétius to Lefebvre-Laroche, dated Sept. 8, 1768, both of which were included in the edition of Helvétius' works published in 1795. Hitherto these letters have been regarded as genuine. In regard to the opinion of Montesquieu as an aristocratic conservative, cf. Linguet, La France plus qu'angloise, pp. 114-15.

²Montesquieu, Esprit de lois, Bk. V, chap. xix, in Oeuvres complètes de Montesquieu ..., ed. Edouard Laboulaye (7 vols.; Paris, 1875-79), III, 216.

history developed by the popular school before the Revolution, a critique based upon this traditional interpretation of English history as a struggle fundamentally between crown and nation, which had led the popular party to adopt the relativist mode of argument, to maintain that there was no real analogy between English and French conditions and therefore no reason to consider England as a model. Formerly the popular school, upon the assumption that there was an analogy, had argued only that the example of England was bad in itself. But that was before they had come to grips with the problem of privilege in their own country, a problem for which English history as they understood it provided no close parallel. To be sure, there were royal tyranny and corruption in England; but privilege had been pretty well destroyed a long time since, before the beginning of the modern era in fact. Equality had been a kind of by-product of the early phases of the struggle between liberty and authority. The Revolution of 1688, the model revolution, had been only a political event. With respect to privilege, therefore, one could not in this traditional interpretation condemn the example of England.

And yet simultaneously the popular party continued to argue that there was an analogy between French and English conditions and that the government of England was bad in itself. An aristocratic issue of a kind was trumped up respecting England. It was declared that privilege still survived in that country, although nothing very specific was adduced in support of this contention. The division of legislative authority was said to have resulted in an alliance between the crown and the nobility. A "direct despotism" existed in England, said Condorcet, because the veto of the king and the House of Lords left to the people no means of revoking a bad law, while an "indirect despotism" existed in that the House of Commons did not really represent the nation but was essentially an aristocratic body whose resolutions were dictated by some forty or fifty persons, either peers, ministers, or members of the House of Commons itself.¹

The prerogatives of the crown in England were asserted by the popular party to be far too extensive and quite incompatible with the principle that the king, the executive, should be only a

¹Idées sur le despotisme, in Oeuvres, IX, 148-49. Upon this point see also the references in note 1, p. 135.

mandatory of the people. An absolute veto upon legislation was one of the most intolerable of those prerogatives. Although some of the representatives who voted for a suspensive veto did so because they wished to see some brake set against democracy, on the whole the suspensive veto was voted in the name of the sovereignty of the people, as something equivalent to a popular referendum.¹

Regarding English civil liberty two views were taken by the popular party. One was that such liberty was only the consequence of a few good laws which Frenchmen might imitate without

¹Pétition de Villeneuve, Avis aux françois sur le salut de la patrie, pp. 88-94; the same, in Journal des débats, No. 5 (Sept. 1, 1789), p. 3; Sieyes, Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?, pp. 61-62; Livingston, Examen du gouvernement d'Angleterre, passim, including the notes by Dupont de Nemours and others; Helvétius to Lefebvre-Laroche on the constitution of England, Sept. 8, 1768 [apocryphal: see note 1, p. 133 and appendix below], Oeuvres complètes d'Helvétius (14 vols.; Paris, 1795), XIV, 78-87; [A.-E.-N. Fantin des Odoards], Considérations sur le gouvernement qui convient à la France et sur les moyens de concourir au rétablissement des finances de l'état, en vendant pour deux milliards des biens du clergé. Par un citoyen de Paris, membre du district des Cordeliers (1789), pp. 83-88; Dupont de Nemours, De la périodicité des assemblées nationales, de leur organisation, de la forme à suivre pour amener les propositions qui pourront y être faites, à devenir des lois; et de la sanction nécessaire pour que ces lois soient obligatoires (Paris, 1789), pp. 6 and 11-12; [J.-P. Marat], Projet de déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, suivi d'un plan de constitution juste, sage et libre (Paris, 1789), pp. 28-30; Marat to the President of the Estates-General, Aug. 23, 1789, Correspondance de Marat, pp. 100-3; La Rochefoucauld, Opinion de M. de duc de la Rochefoucauld, député de Paris, 7 septembre 1789 [1789], p. 4 and passim; Rabaut Saint-Étienne, L'opinion de M. Rabaut St. Étienne sur quelques points de la constitution [Paris, 1789], pp. 6-9; the same, in Journal des débats, No. 10 (Sept. 4, 1789), p. 6; [François] de Fange, De la sanction royale (Paris, 1789), p. 40; [J.-B.] Salle, Opinion de M. Salle, député de Lorraine, sur la sanction royale, à la séance du premier septembre 1789 (Paris, 1789), pp. 26-27; [Baptiste-Henri] Grégoire, Opinion de M. Grégoire, curé d'Embermenil, député de Nancy, sur la sanction royale, p. 8, n.; the same, in Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée nationale, III, 2; Lanjuinais, in Journal des débats, No. 13 (Sept. 7, 1789), p. 2; De Leipand, ibid., No. 7 (Sept. 2, 1789), p. 5; Révolutions de Paris, No. 8 (Sept. 1, 1789), p. 19; [J.-L. Carra], L'orateur des états-généraux. Seconde partie (Paris, 1789), p. 21; L'aristocratie enchaînée et surveillée par le peuple et le roi; suivi d'un mémoire des barons nés de Languedoc et de la réponse à leurs prétentions exorbitantes. Par J. L. G. S. (Jan. 31, 1789), p. 7; Anon., L'anti-sanctionnaire anglois, ou aiguillon à la constitution (1789), passim; Anon., Lettre du roi d'Angleterre au roi de France, sur les états-généraux (1789), p. 5 and passim; Anon., États-généraux de l'an mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix-neuf. Dédiés à l'assemblée nationale. Par un député des communes (1789), pp. 8-9.

imitating the English constitution in the narrow sense of the division of legislative authority.¹ This was a familiar view which had been characteristic of Physiocracy and even of the older Anglophile liberalism. But the school of Mably and Rousseau had propagated the view that in the last analysis civil and political liberty stood or fell together. So, lest Frenchmen persist in inferring that because the English had civil liberty they must likewise have political liberty, it was also asserted that civil liberty in England was much overrated. In England, for example, there existed imprisonment for debt, a case in which the famous Act of Habeas Corpus did not apply; there was the press-gang for the recruitment of seamen; complete religious toleration was denied; and freedom of the press was founded not on statute but only on precedent, which was assumed to be less reliable than statute.² To this array of inadequacies publicists who possessed free-trade beliefs added that in England economic liberty was incomplete.³

Finally, the popular party declared that the French people had been blinded by the prestige of the English name. Let them now see for the first time. Let them not copy an imperfect model but create instead a government which would reflect the enlightenment of the century.⁴

¹Livingston, Examen du gouvernement d'Angleterre, notes of Dupont and others, pp. 76-77; "Lettre de M. Helvétius au président de Montesquieu," Lettres de M. Helvétius ... relatives à l'aristocratie de la noblesse, p. 13; Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?, pp. 62-63; Salle, Opinion ... sur la sanction royale, p. 27.

²Livingston, Examen du gouvernement d'Angleterre, notes of Dupont and others, pp. 73-75, 81-84, and 185-87; Condorcet, Idées sur le despotisme, in Oeuvres, IX, 154; Grégoire, Opinion ... sur la sanction royale, pp. 7-8, n.

³Livingston, Examen du gouvernement d'Angleterre, notes, pp. 74 and 79-80; Grégoire, Opinion ... sur la sanction royale, p. 7, n.

⁴Anon., Exposé des principes de droit public, qui démontrent que les députés du tiers-état se sont légalement constitués comme représentant la nation. Par l'auteur des Quatre mots, adressés au journaliste des états-généraux (1789), p. 7; Helvétius to Lefebvre-Laroche on the constitution of England, Sept. 8, 1768 [apocryphal], in Oeuvres (1795), XIV, 78-84; Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?, pp. 61-63; Robespierre, Dire ... contre le veto royal, p. 12; De Chénier, Dénonciation des inquisiteurs de la pensée, pp. 57-58; Lanjuinais, in Journal des débats, No. 13 (Sept. 7, 1789), p. 2; Barnave, ibid., No. 7 (Sept. 2, 1789), p. 5.

In this great debate of 1789 over the political representation of the aristocracy and the power of the king it was evident that, except with the ultra-conservatives, Anglophile ideas had become associated entirely with counter-revolution. Conversely, the only doctrine which still had a revolutionary meaning was that of the sovereignty of the nation. Yet it would be much less than the truth to say that the latter gospel was entirely of an anti-aristocratic and anti-monarchical character, for it had also become the leading nationalist doctrine.

The background of national sentiment in France was now, as before, the rivalry with England. The successful termination of the War for American Independence was a source of immense satisfaction to the pride of Frenchmen of all classes, who exulted that they had humbled the "haughty islanders," preserved the freedom of the seas, and again raised France to the rank among the powers to which she was entitled.¹ They might, now that the score was evened and honor satisfied, feel a certain glow of geniality toward the former enemy. There can be found a number of more or less idealistically expressed utterances of a wish for Anglo-French co-operation rather than a continuance of enmity, and even Lafayette, who had been an ardent hater of the English, experienced a desire at the conclusion of the peace to join the crowds of his fellow-countrymen who were pouring across the Channel, and wrote, upon entertaining at his house the youthful but already renowned William Pitt, that he now felt a great pleasure in meeting Englishmen. But the aforesaid expressions of a wish for Anglo-French co-operation were usually made in connection with

¹[J.-B.] Mailhe, Discours qui a remporté le prix à l'Académie des jeux floraux en 1784, sur la grandeur et l'importance de la révolution qui vient de s'opérer dans l'Amérique Septentrionale (Toulouse, 1784), pp. 36-37; [Chavannes de la Giraudière], L'Amérique délivrée, esquisse d'un poème sur l'indépendance de l'Amérique (2 vols.; Amsterdam, 1783), passim and II, 477, n. 5; Fantin des Odcards, Histoire de France, depuis la mort de Louis XIV jusqu'à la paix de Versailles de 1783 (8 vols.; Paris, 1789), VIII, 375-77 and 409 [obviously written soon after the peace]; Cérutti, L'aigle et le hibou, ou l'ami de la lumière et l'ami des ténèbres, fable, p. 9, in Oeuvres diverses, Vol. II; [Lescène des Maisons], Qu'est-ce que les parlemens en France? (The Hague, 1788), p. 56; Courtial, Ode sur la paix, reviewed in Journal des sçavans, April, 1784, p. 221; Labrat, Ode sur la paix, quoted in Mercur de France, March 5, 1785, p. 44; Jean-Baptiste, Baron de Cloots du Val-de-Grace ["Anacharsis Cloots"], Voeux d'un Gallophile (new ed. rev.; Amsterdam, 1786), pp. 1-2; Ségur, Mémoires, II, 30; Lafayette, Mémoires, I, 8-9 [written ca. 1783-84].

the idea that France was as great a power as England, if not greater than her neighbor, and as notable a leader of civilization,¹ while Lafayette admitted candidly that his pleasure in seeing Englishmen resulted from the fact that France had won the war. His change of heart, he added, was not complete, for "without having the self-conceit to treat them as personal enemies, I can not forget that they are enemies of French glory and prosperity."²

It seemed to French observers that although the imperialistic ambitions of the English had received a set-back, their imperialistic attitude persisted. While denunciations were not so general as they had been during the American Revolution, examples are not infrequent. The English, it was held, seemed to have forgotten that they had been defeated in America, so little were they inclined to withdraw from the territory they had surrendered or to alter their navigation system in favor of freer trade. To be sure, they had the American trade without liberalizing their navigation policy; it was a source of chagrin to French feelings that the French themselves had not been able to secure any considerable share of it. In the empire that still remained to the English, Frenchmen saw a continuance of the same sort of oppressive policy that had occasioned the American Revolution. Despite "home rule," Ireland had no true equality in the empire. The rule of the East India Company provoked expressions of pious horror. The two India Bills of Fox and Pitt, respectively, attracted much attention. While the impeachment of the former governor of India Warren Hastings, which was regarded with admiration as a great example of justice rendered by a government to its subjects, did something to offset the idea of English tyranny within the empire, the good effect was undone by the policy of the Triple Alliance in The Netherlands, which in 1787 brought

¹Cérutti, *L'aigle et le hibou*, pp. 9 and 21-22, in *Oeuvres diverses*, Vol. II; [Dupont de Nemours], *Lettre à la chambre du commerce de Normandie; sur le mémoire qu'elle a publié relativement au traité de commerce avec l'Angleterre* (Rouen and Paris, 1788), p. 266; Métra, *op. cit.*, XVIII, 315-16 (Aug. 18, 1785); *La France et l'Angleterre, dialogue . . .*, quoted and reviewed in *Journal encyclopédique*, 1786, VII, 365-67; *Année littéraire*, 1784, II, 333.

²Lafayette to unknown [Oct. 1783], *Mémoires*, II, 160-61. The date 1786 given by the editors is clearly incorrect, for the only time that Pitt was ever in France was in 1783.

France and England to the verge of war. Nothing could have been more reprehensible, it was declared, than the alliance of England, Prussia, and the Stadtholder against the Dutch Republican and Patriot parties. Dutch domestic liberty had been sacrificed to England's imperial ambitions. The latter were directed against France as well as Holland, it appeared. Behind the whole policy of the Triple Alliance, it was thought, was the intent to humiliate France.¹

Anglo-French trade was another question which called forth expressions of resentment and nationalist feeling. This trade, the reader may be reminded, had long been governed by a mutual regime of high duties and prohibitions, only occasionally relaxed. There was no trade treaty. At first, after the war, complaints were acrid because the English seemed disinclined to conclude the

¹Comte de Mirabeau, Doutes sur la liberté de l'Escaut réclamée par l'empereur; sur les causes et sur les conséquences probables de cette réclamation (London [1785]), pp. 8, 21, and 75-80; Comte de Mirabeau to a Hollander, Nov. 1787, quoted in Brissot, Mémoires (1754-1793), ed. Claude Perroud (2 vols.; Paris [1911]), II, 175-76; Comte de Mirabeau, Aux Bataves sur le stathouderat ([Amsterdam?], 1788), passim; [Comte de Mirabeau], Le despotisme de la maison d'Orange prouvé par l'histoire. Par Karel van Ligtdal ("In Holland" [1788]), p. 9 and passim; Brissot, Tableau de la situation actuelle dans les Indes orientales, et de l'état de l'Inde en général, No. 1 (London, 1784), pp. 9-13; Etienne Clavière and J. P. Brissot, De la France et des États-Unis, ou De l'importance de la révolution de l'Amérique pour le bonheur de la France, des rapports de ce royaume et des États-Unis, des avantages réciproques qu'ils peuvent retirer de leurs liaisons de commerce, et enfin de la situation actuelle des États-Unis (London, 1787), pp. 11-xiii; [Louis-Gabriel Bourdon], Voyage d'Amérique. Dialogue en vers, entre l'auteur et l'abbé*** (London and Paris, 1786), pp. 124-35; Condorcet, Lettres d'un bourgeois de New-Haven, in Oeuvres, IX, 44; Lafayette, "Observations sur le commerce entre la France et les États-Unis" [1783], in Louis Gottschalk (ed.), "Lafayette as Commercial Agent," American Historical Review, XXXVI (1931), 564-70; Lafayette to Washington, May 14, 1784, Sparks MSS LXXXVIII, Part I, Harvard College Library; Lafayette to Washington, March 15, 1785, ibid.; Lafayette to Washington, May 24, 1786, ibid.; Lafayette to Knox, Feb. 4, 1789, Massachusetts Historical Society; Lescène des Maisons, Histoire politique de la révolution en France, I, 58-59 and II, 6; Livingston, Examen du gouvernement d'Angleterre, notes of Dupont and others, p. 98; Helvétius to Lefebvre de la Laroche, Sept. 8, 1768 [apocryphal], Oeuvres (1795), XIV, 89-90; M. de Lescure (ed.), Correspondance secrète, II, 190 (Oct. 15, 1787) and 198 (Nov. 12, 1787); Analyse des papiers anglais, 1787-89, passim; Courier de l'Europe, XXI, 345 (May 22, 1787); Journal général de l'Europe, I [1785], "Introduction politique," pp. 13-15; ibid., 1788, I, "Discours préliminaire," p. 44; ibid., II, 313-14.

commercial convention which had been forecast in the treaty of peace in 1783. A part of the idea of the freedom of the seas had been that France should gain admittance to the commerce of England and her empire. Not only did the English dally about a treaty, they did not unilaterally relax their trade restrictions. The French government, on the other hand, had followed up the peace by admitting foreign ships to the French sugar islands. French shipowners complained loudly that these foreigners were depriving them of the trade of their own colonies, and vented their anger upon their government and upon the English both.¹ In 1785, in retaliation against the maintenance of English tariff and navigation walls, the French government prohibited completely the importation into France of numerous important classes of English goods upon which restrictions had formerly been relaxed. Finally, in 1786, a low-tariff treaty, the Eden Treaty, was negotiated between France and England.

Except for doctrinaire extremists like Condorcet, who thought all commercial treaties should be proscribed because, as the example of England demonstrated, they delivered the nation to the monopolistic interests of the commercial class,² the free-trade school rejoiced. But since the treaty operated to increase competition in France between English and French textiles and hardware, the manufacturing interests protested. The treaty was widely declared to have been the cause of the industrial depression which was in full progress throughout the country in 1787.³ While the government was itself taken to task for not having solicited the opinion of the industrial and commercial interests before drawing up the terms, hostility as before was directed also against the English. It was said that, while inundating France with their goods, the English were on their side boycotting French products.⁴ At the time of the Anglo-French crisis of 1787

¹Métra, op. cit., XVIII, 271-73 (July 28, 1785).

²Condorcet, Lettres d'un bourgeois de New-Haven, in Oeuvres, IX, 44. Cf. Journal général de l'Europe, 1788, I, 305-6.

³E. Levasseur, Histoire du commerce de la France (2 vols.; Paris, 1911-12), I, 542-44; Frances Acomb (ed.), "Unemployment and Relief in Champagne, 1788," Journal of Modern History, XI (1939), 43, nn. 8 and 9, and 46, n. 16. Cf. Courier de l'Europe, XX, 303 (Nov. 10, 1786).

⁴Bachaumont, op. cit., XXXVI, 3-4 (Sept. 11, 1787).

over the policy of the Triple Alliance in Holland, opinion in Normandy, a manufacturing area, was reputed to be in favor of War in order to get rid of the treaty.¹ The Norman Chamber of Commerce declared that the English had been only too well aware of the fact that without protection it would be a very long time before French industry could compete with English industry on equal terms.² They refused to accept³ the thesis which the Neo-Physiocrat Dupont de Nemours set forth, to the effect that competition would only serve to toughen French industry and bring it to maturity.⁴ This way of looking at the matter had also been shown in a speech made just before the treaty went into effect by the director of the École Royale Gratuite de Dessin, who had urged the students to redouble their efforts to perfect the national manufactures in order to maintain superiority over foreign products.⁵ In certain places, however, it became patriotic to "buy French." For instance, at the textile centers of Rouen and Lyon balls were given to which were admitted only people dressed in materials of French manufacture, referred to as modes patriotiques.⁶

Dupont's opinion in favor of international competition, which was expressed with considerable anti-English animus, was as nationalist as that of the manufacturing interests.⁷ Indeed, it was even more nationalist than theirs. While the protectionist logic was not incompatible with the idea that France had potentially as great economic power as England, and while there definitely had been and still was a mercantilist nationalism, the point of

¹Ibid., p. 118 (Oct. 25, 1787).

²Observations de la chambre du commerce de Normandie, sur le traité de commerce entre la France et l'Angleterre [1787 or early 1788], pp. 48-50 and passim.

³Chambre du Commerce de Normandie, Réfutation des principes et assertions contenus dans une lettre qui a pour titre: Lettre à la chambre du commerce de Normandie, sur le mémoire qu'elle a publié relativement au traité de commerce avec l'Angleterre, par M. D. P. (1788), passim.

⁴Dupont de Nemours, Lettre à la chambre du commerce de Normandie, pp. 48-50 and passim.

⁵Bachaumont, op. cit., XXXIII, 265 (Dec. 31, 1786).

⁶Courier de l'Europe, XXIII, 75 (Feb. 1, 1788).

⁷See above, p. 55.

view of the manufacturing interests was narrower than that of the free-traders and their confidence in the national future less hardy.

The Physiocrats, as economic liberals, had been the first to exhibit in their doctrine the union of nationalism and reform. In the classic period of Physiocracy, before the American war, political reform tended to be allied with cosmopolitanism, while nationalism, apart from Physiocratic nationalism, tended to be conservative. In the 1780's, the earlier conservative nationalism had lost much of its force, while at the same time reform, political or economic or both, became the mode in which French nationalism was most usually and vigorously expressed. On the whole, the reformers were the most prolific in expressions of confidence in the material greatness of their country. It was they who, glorying in the history of French "philosophy," were the most conscious of the leading rôle of France in the development of contemporary European civilization.

One of the factors in the union of nationalism and reform in the 1780's was the absorption of Physiocratic nationalism into the doctrine of the popular school. To the concept of the sovereignty of the nation which the latter had developed in opposition to the divided sovereignty of Anglophile liberalism, to the emphasis of the popular school upon the idea of political devotion as against that self-interest which it was alleged had corrupted the "republican monarchy" of England, there were now joined the Physiocratic ideal of cultural and economic cohesion, the Physiocratic faith in the strength, both material and spiritual, of France, and the Physiocratic pride of nationality.

Another factor in the union of nationalism and reform was the participation of Frenchmen in the American Revolution. The American war had, as contemporaries pointed out,¹ contributed

¹[Lally-Tollendal?], Mémoires de Weber, concernant Marie-Antoinette ..., ed. MM. Berville and Barrière ("Collection des mémoires relatifs à la Révolution française," XI and XII) (2 vols.; Paris, 1822), I, 128-32 and 170-72; Garat, Mémoires historiques, II, 319; Ségur, Mémoires, I, 132 and 291; Prince de Montbarey, Mémoires autographes (3 vols.; Paris, 1826-27), III, 135 ff.; Marquis de Clermont-Gallerande, Mémoires particuliers pour servir à l'histoire de la Révolution qui s'est opérée en France en 1789 (3 vols.; Paris, 1826), I, 10; Comte Valentin Esterhazy, Mémoires, ed. Ernest Daudet (Paris, 1905), p. 186; Lescène des Maisons, Histoire politique de la révolution en France, I, 6-7. Cf. L. Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution (Chicago, 1942), pp. 420-21.

to the extension of liberal opinion in the 1780's. It had also avenged the honor of France and contributed to the confidence of Frenchmen in their country's powers. One notices the close association in this decade of the two ideals of the political glory of France and the freedom of the citizen. The most vocal opposition to English imperial policies came at this time from liberals. When agitators like the Comte de Mirabeau and Lafayette supported the cause of liberty abroad, as they did in Ireland and in Holland, they were combatting English imperialism no less than the tyranny of governments.

French greatness, the reformers thought, was of course not fully realized, and it was their business to achieve that end. Anglomania in the 1780's was up to a point a reforming influence. Even what has been called in the foregoing pages conservative Anglomania was reformist in so far as it contributed to the establishment of limited monarchy in place of royal absolutism and to the removal of abuses and inequality. Anglophile arguments were usually more nationalist than cosmopolitan. The viewpoint they expressed was that France had only to imitate English government and certain English policies, especially in financial reconstruction, to attain that pre-eminence to which her resources and her genius entitled her.¹ But around Anglophile ideas there still lingered something of the cosmopolitan attitude, some worship of the foreigner and his ways, as well as the acceptance of the idea of conflicting interests in government.

Indubitably, the doctrine of the sovereignty of the nation was more nationalist than Anglophile doctrine. The popular school not only held that party interest should somehow be merged in the general interest; they also held that reform should consist not in what they called the "servile" imitation of another people,

¹Anon., Lettre d'un Suisse aux Français, pp. 3, 21, and passim; Réponse des négociants de la ville de Grenoble, à MM. les Juges consuls de Montauban, Clermont-Ferrand, Châlons, Orléans, Tours, Besançon, Dunkerque et Saint-Quentin, et à la chambre de commerce de Picardie, de Saint-Malo et de l'Isle en Flandre [1788], pp. 3-10; De Sainte-Albine, Projet d'une banque nationale à établir en France (1789), pp. 1-7; [Étienne Clavière], De la foi publique envers les créanciers de l'état. Lettres à M. Linguet sur le n. CXVI de ses annales (London, 1788), pp. 53-54, 127-28, and 142-43; Soulès, Le véritable patriotisme, pp. 2-33; Rabaut Saint-Étienne, À la nation française, p. 35.

who happened moreover to be the traditional enemy of their country, but in surpassing that other people's achievement, by the light of reason.¹ There was a peculiarly French flavor to this rationalism. A Swiss publicist who was in France in 1789 and in close touch with the National Constituent Assembly, thus described the temper of that body to an English friend, Sir Samuel Romilly:

They have so much national vanity, so much pretension, that they will prefer all kinds of stupidities of their own choice to the results of British experience. . . . They are agreed that you have two or three fine laws; but it is insupportable that you should have the presumption to say that you have a constitution.²

It was of course the popular party, the most numerous in the National Assembly, to which this writer was referring. An even clearer notion of the way in which nationalist sentiment got involved in the constitutional debate of the summer of 1789 can be derived from the utterances of devotees of the popular faith themselves. "The representatives of the French nation," declared Robespierre, "masters of [the science of] giving to their country a constitution worthy of her and of the wisdom of this century, were not made to copy servilely an institution born in times of ignorance, of necessity, and of the strife of opposing factions"³--in other words, the English constitution. With yet more exaltation of tone, the journalist Camille Desmoulins asserted: "We shall go beyond these English, who are so proud of their constitution and who mocked at our servitude."⁴

While it has often been said that French nationalism was

¹Cérutti, Épître en vers irréguliers, sur les jardins, l'agriculture, les assemblées provinciales, les ministres, les parlemens, la tolérance, etc., écrite en 1787 à M. de Marnesia, auteur du poëme de la Nature champêtre, et désigné alors Président du District du Mont-Jura, pp. 10-12, in Oeuvres diverses, Vol. II; [Bourdon], Le patriote, ou préservatif contre l'anglomanie, passim, in Littérature patriotique, Vol. XVI; Dupont, De la périodicité des assemblées nationales, pp. 10-12; Pierre-Étienne Dumont to Samuel Romilly, June 21, 1789, in Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romilly, Written by Himself, with a Selection from his Correspondence, edited by his sons (2d ed.; 3 vols.; London, 1840), I, 354-55; Robespierre, Dire ... contre le veto royal, p. 12; Camille Desmoulins, La France libre (3d ed.; 1789), p. 69.

²Dumont to Sir Samuel Romilly, June 21, 1789, in Romilly, Memoirs, I, 354-55.

³Dire ... contre le veto royal, p. 12.

⁴La France libre, p. 69.

a consequence of the Revolution, it would be more true to say that the Revolution was, at least in part, the consequence of French nationalism, which was then largely conceived as a reaction against admiration of English institutions and English ideas, against English imperialism, and against the national character of Englishmen. As an influence upon reform in France throughout the eighteenth century the example of England had two aspects. The earlier aspect, and a persistent one, was that which was reflected in the ideals of the Anglophiles, a comparatively cosmopolitan group. But the reforming spirit was the more zealous and effective when associated with national ideals and feelings.

"England," said a contemporary in the early days of the Revolution, "is our model and our rival, our guiding light and our enemy."¹ It is not unlikely that the English nation, as an enemy, had more to do with the advent of the Revolution in France than as a model.

¹[J.-P.-L. de Luchet], Les contemporains de 1789 et 1790, ou les opinions débattues pendant la première législature; avec les principaux événements de la révolution. Rédigé par l'auteur de la Galerie des états-généraux (3 vols.; Paris, 1790), I, 56.

